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Insurance Law. Asermely v. Allstate Insurance Co., 728 A.2d 461
(R.I. 1999). An insurance company's fiduciary obligation extends
not only to the insurer's policyholders but also parties to whom the
insureds have assigned their rights. In addition, the insurance
company must go beyond acting in good faith and must consider
any reasonable offer to settle within the insureds' policy limits.
Failure to seriously consider a reasonable settlement puts the in-
surance company at risk of having to accept the judgment awarded
at trial, even if the judgment amount is greater than the policy
limits.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This lawsuit stems from an automobile accident that took
place on July 9, 1984, when Michelle Asermely (Asermely) rear-
ended a vehicle operated by Mark Rendine (Rendine). 1 The car,
owned by Julianne Bernier (Bernier), was insured through Allstate
Insurance Company (Allstate), with a policy having a $50,000
limit.2 Asermely commenced suit against both Rendine and Ber-
nier. In September of 1989, a court-annexed arbitrator awarded
Asermely $47, 557.37, finding that Asermely was 25% at fault.3
Asermely accepted this award through an attorney's letter to the
arbitrator, but Allstate rejected the result and went forward to
trial.4
At the jury trial, Asermely was found to be sixty percent at
fault, and Allstate's insured was found to be fourty percent at
fault.5 Asermely was awarded $86,333.57, representing an award
of $47,408.56 plus interest and $50 in costs.6 Allstate issued a
check to Asermely for $50,000 on January 9, 1990 "with a state-
ment indicating it was a final settlement of any and all claims aris-
ing from bodily injury and property damage caused by accident on
7/9/84." 7
1. See Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461, 462 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 461 n.1.
7. Id. at 462-63.
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Asermely refused to accept this check and subsequently filed
an action for debt on the judgment in superior court.8 At this
point, Rendine and Bernier assigned their rights to Asermely.9 A
second check for $50,000 was issued to Asermely on May 24, 1991,
which Asermely then negotiated.10 Thereafter, Asermely brought
a five-count complaint against Allstate."' Allstate moved for sum-
mary judgment, which the trial court granted with respect to
counts one, three, and four. 12 Asermely appealed. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Count One
Count one of Asermely's claim alleged she was owed interest
on the judgment in excess of the policy limits pursuant to Rhode
Island General Laws section 27-7-2.2.14 The trial judge held that
Asermely's letter to the arbitrator did not satisfy the requirements
of section 27-7-2.2 because the language of the letter was vague
and not "definite in its terms to constitute an offer."' 5 Testimony
by Asermely's attorney that he intended the wording of his letter to
mean acceptance of the offered award plus interest further pro-
pelled the trial judge to find it ambiguous and unclear. 16 Conse-
quently, he granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment. 17
8. See id. at 463.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. Count two, alleging that "the defendant breached its duty to exer-
cise good faith in handling of plaintiffs claim" and count five, alleging a breach of
contract, are not at issue on appeal. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id. Section 27-7-2.2 of the Rhode Island General Laws provides:
in any civil action in which the defendant is covered by liability insurance
and in which the plaintiff makes a written offer to the defendant's insurer
to settle the action in an amount equal to or less than the coverage limits
on the liability policy in force at the time the action accrues, and the offer
is rejected by the defendant's insurer, then the defendant's insurer shall
be liable for a interest due on the judgment entered by the court even if
the payment of the judgment and interest totals a sum in excess of the
policy coverage limitation. This written offer shall be presumed to have
been rejected if the insurer does not respond in writing within a period of
thirty (30) days."
R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.2 (1956) (1998 Reenactment).
15. Asermely, 728 A.2d at 463.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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The supreme court, reviewing the case de novo, held that the trial
judge erred by granting summary judgment because the question
of whether Asermely's letter was a written offer to settle within the
purview of section 27-7-2.2 raised a genuine issue of material
fact.18 The supreme court vacated summary judgment in regards
to this count and remanded to the trial court for further determi-
nation of the status of the letter.19
Count Three
Count three alleged that "defendant made fraudulent misrep-
resentations, with the intention of deceiving and inducing the
Plaintiff to sign said settlement check."20 The court indicated that
fraudulent misrepresentation or deceit exists only when the de-
fendant not only intended to deceive the plaintiff, but the plaintiff,
to his detriment, relied on the deceit.21 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court found that Asermely did not allege or present any evidence
indicating a detrimental reliance on fraudulent misrepresentation
by Allstate.22 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment with regard to count three.23
Count Four
Count four of Asermely's complaint claimed that Allstate acted
in bad faith, disregarding its duty to its insured.24 The supreme
court applied the rule of Rumford Property and Liability v. Car-
bone,25 pointing out that it is well established that "'there cannot
be a showing of bad faith when the insurer is able to demonstrate a
reasonable basis for denying benefits.'" 26 Moreover, if the claim of
bad faith is in any way debatable, liability in tort does not exist.27
Since it was clear that the trial justice had enough evidence at trial
18. See id.
19. See id. at 463-64.
20. Id. at 464.
21. See id. (citing Guglielmi v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Fin. Corp., 573 A.2d
687, 690 (R.I. 1990); LaFazia v. Howe, 575 A.2d 182, 185 (R.I. 1990)).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. 590 A.2d 398 (R.I. 1991).
26. See Asermely, 728 A.2d at 464 (quoting Rumford Property and Liability,
590 A.2d at 400).
27. See id. (citing Rumford Property and Liability, 590 A.2d at 400 (quoting
Bibeault v. Insurance Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I. 1980))).
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to determine that a debatable claim existed, summary judgment
was the appropriate resolution. 28
Although the supreme court concluded that the trial justice
properly granted summary judgment with regard to count four, it
also promulgated a new rule governing an insurance company's
duty to consider reasonable offers for settlement. The court noted
that insurance companies have a fiduciary obligation to act in the
best interest of the insured, and may not subjugate the insured's
interests to the insurance company's financial interests.29 Where
an insured assigns his or her rights, this obligation is owed to the
assignee. 30
Applying this principle to the general circumstances of the
present case, the court stated that the obligation goes beyond a
duty to act in good faith, and requires an insurance company "to
consider seriously a plaintiffs reasonable offer to settle within the
policy limits."31 Thus, the insurer must consider all reasonable of-
fers to settle within the policy limits where there is adequate no-
tice given to the insurer and the offer is in writing.32 Where the
insurer refuses to accept such an offer, and the judgment exceeds
the policy limits, the insurer must pay for the amount of the judg-
ment exceeding the policy as well as interest.3 3 In addition, the
court stated that a good faith belief that the insurer has a legiti-
mate defense will not relieve the insurer from this obligation if the
plaintiff is awarded a judgment.34
CONCLUSION
In Asermely v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Rhode Island
Supreme Court promulgated a new rule governing insurance com-
panies. An insurer owes a duty to its insured or its insured's as-
signees to seriously consider any reasonable offer of settlement
made by a plaintiff. If the insurance company fails to do so and
proceeds to trial, it does so at the risk of having to pay any dam-
ages awarded to the plaintiff in excess of the policy limits. An in-
28. See id.
29. See id. (citing Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Assoc. of Rhode Is-
land v. Rhode Island Ins. Insolvency Fund, 703 A.2d 1097, 1102 (R.I. 1997)).
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
20001
762 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:601
surer can escape this obligation only by demonstrating that the
insured or the insured's assignee was unwilling to accept an offer
of settlement from the insurance company.
Danielle T. Jenkins
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Insurance Law. Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Co., 742 A.2d 282
(R.I. 1999). In an action by an insured against his Uninsured Mo-
torist (UM) carrier, the insured was entitled to pre-judgment inter-
est when the UM carrier breached its duty to the plaintiff by
failing to cover his damages. The court also found that defendant,
the UM carrier, refused to arbitrate the coverage dispute, and
therefore found defendant liable for pre-judgment interest even be-
yond the policy limits.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 20, 1995, Shaun Menard (Menard) and Marty
Webber (Webber) attempted to drive Menard's Jeep over a narrow,
abandoned railroad trestle that crossed sixty to seventy feet above
the Moosup River in Western Coventry, Rhode Island.' Menard
and Webber managed to get the Jeep stuck on the trestle at an
awkward angle.2 They then decided to leave the Jeep there and
began to drink a few beers.3 When the two returned to the Jeep,
Webber fell off the bridge.4 Menard ran to the nearby home of the
plaintiff, Robert Skaling, (Skaling) in order to get help.5 Skaling
admitted that he had consumed five or six drinks by the time
Menard arrived at his house.6 Skaling retrieved a blanket and
drove to the bridge, where he attempted to cross it in order to find
Menard and Webber. 7 As he passed the Jeep, Skaling fell off the
bridge, and sustained serious injuries.8
Skaling made a claim for damages against Menard, claiming
that Menard's negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries. 9
Menard's liability carrier settled for the full limits of the policy,
which was $25,000.00.10 Skaling then sought recovery from the
defendant, his UM carrier." Aetna denied the claim, on the
grounds that plaintiff had not established that his injuries were
1. See Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 742 A.2d 282, 285 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 286.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
20001 763
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caused by Menard's use of the Jeep.12 Aetna also refused plaintiffs
attempts to submit the issue of coverage to arbitration.13 Plaintiff
then filed suit in superior court, seeking a determination of cover-
age under the UM policy.1 4 After all of the evidence had been sub-
mitted, Aetna filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, on
the grounds that plaintiff had failed to establish that Menard had
proximately caused his injuries.15 The jury returned a verdict for
Skaling, and found that his damages were $1,174,500.00, which
they then reduced by 10% due to the plaintiffs contributory negli-
gence. 16 After the jury verdict, the trial judge denied Aetna's mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law.' 7
Skaling then moved for addition of pre-judgment interest,
which motion was denied.' 8 Aetna filed a motion for a new trial.19
The trial judge denied these motions and awarded the plaintiff
$300,000.00, representing the limits under the UM policy. 20 From
the denial of their respective motions, the parties filed cross
appeals. 2'
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion
written by Justice Lederberg, held that the trial court properly de-
nied pre-judgment interest on the entire damage award, but erro-
neously denied pre-judgment interest on the actual $300,000.00
recovery. 22 Skaling argued that section 27-7-2.2 of the Rhode Is-
land General Laws entitled him to pre-judgment interest on the
jury's entire damage award.23 Section 27-7-2.2 provides that in
any case in which the defendant is covered by liability insurance,
and the liability insurer refuses to settle after a written offer is
made, the plaintiff is entitled to recover interest from the liability
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 286-87.
17. See id. at 287.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 290-92.
23. See id. at 290.
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insurer on the entire judgment, regardless of whether such figure
exceeds the policy limits. 24
The court disagreed with Skaling's argument, however, and
found instead that the plain language of the statute renders it ap-
plicable only to situations in which the defendant tortfeasor is cov-
ered by the liability insurer.25 This case, on the other hand,
involved a liability insurer itself as the defendant, rather than one
who is covered by liability insurance. The court found the statute
to be limited, by its plain terms, to situations involving tortfeasors
covered by a liability insurer, not plaintiffs suing their own UM
carriers. 26 Thus, the court denied Skaling's argument for interest
on the entire damage award.
Skaling's second argument was that section 9-21-10 of the
Rhode Island General Laws permitted him to recover pre-judg-
ment interest on the actual $300,000.00 recovery granted under
the terms of the UM policy.27 Section 9-21-10 permits recovery of
interest, calculated at 12 % per annum "[iin any civil action in
which a verdict is rendered or a decision made for pecuniary
damages."28
The court concluded that Aetna had breached its contract with
Skaling by refusing to cover his damages up to the policy limits. 29
The court found that Skaling had demanded arbitration of the cov-
erage dispute, and that Aetna refused to participate.30 Even
though the UM contract did not require arbitration, the court
found that Aetna could have limited its damages by engaging in
arbitration, in which case it would have amounted to a mutual
modification of the contract, and Aetna would then not have been
24. See id. The pertinent section of the law reads:
In any civil action in which the defendant is covered by liability insurance
and in which the plaintiff makes a written offer to the defendant's insurer
to settle the action in an amount equal to or less than the coverage limits
on the liability policy in force at the time the action accrues, and the offer
is rejected by the defendant's insurer, then the defendant's insurer shall
be liable for all interest due on the judgment entered by the court even if
the payment of the judgment and interest totals a sum in excess of the
policy coverage limitation.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.2 (1956) (1998 Reenactment).
25. See Skaling,742 A.2d at 290-91.
26. See id. at 291.
27. See id.
28. Id. (quoting R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-21-10 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
29. See id. at 292.
30. See id.
2000] 765
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liable beyond the policy limits. 31 Based on Aetna's refusal of cover-
age to the plaintiff, and its corresponding refusal to arbitrate, the
court held that the situation was covered by the terms of section 9-
21-10, and that Aetna was liable for pre-judgment interest on the
$300,000.00 policy limits. 32
The court also found that its decision was supported by policy
considerations, in that by denying an insurer's liability beyond the
policy limits, there would be no incentive for insurers to attempt to
reach a speedy and just resolution of claims.3 3 If the maximum
pay-out an insurer could make was the policy limits, it would be
most advantageous for the insurer to squarely deny every claim.34
The court held that this outcome would violate the legislative in-
tent behind sections 9-21-10 and 27-7-2.2 of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws, which is to encourage speedy resolution of claims. 35
Thus, the court granted Skaling pre-judgment interest even be-
yond the $300,000.00 policy limits.
CONCLUSION
In Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Co., the Rhode Island Supreme
Court determined that pre-judgment interest does not accrue pur-
suant to section 27-7-2.2 of the Rhode Island General Laws when
the defendant is a liability insurer. However, the court held that
where the insurer breaches its contract with the insured, pre-judg-
ment interest accrues pursuant to section 9-21-10 of the Rhode Is-
land General Laws. Thus, the court granted Skaling pre-judgment
interest, even beyond the UM policy limits, in order to encourage
speedy settlements, and to discourage insurers from denying every
claim under the assurance that their maximum liability would be
the policy limits.
Michael P. Robinson
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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Insurance Law. Textron, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,
723 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 1999). When considering a motion for sum-
mary judgment in a suit against an insurer involving a trigger-of-
coverage issue, the court must consider not only whether the dam-
age existed and was discovered during the period of coverage, but
also whether it could have been, in the exercise of due care, discov-
erable during the coverage period.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Textron, Inc. (Textron), owned and operated a
manufacturing facility in North Carolina, known as the Gastonia
facility.1 The facility was managed by Textron's Homelite Division
(Homelite).2 Various degreasing solvents were necessarily used at
the facility, including trichloroethylene (TCE), trichloroethane
(TCA), and methyl ethyl ketone (MEK).3 The Gastonia facility
maintained underground and above-ground facilities to contain
these organic liquids, as well as other metal waste materials.4
In 1986, North Carolina's Department of Natural Resources
and Community Development (NCDNRCD) contacted all under-
ground storage users in an effort to ensure compliance with im-
pending state and federal regulations on underground storage
tanks.5 The notice from the NCDNRCD prompted Homelite's Di-
rector of Facilities Planning to suggest the removal of the Gastonia
tanks, in order to avoid the risk of contamination by accidental
spillage or leakage.6 An excavation and extraction plan was then
established, pursuant to which the tanks were removed in 1988.7
Upon the removal of the tanks, it became obvious that the
storage tanks were porous and that solvents percolated into the
surrounding soil, causing contamination.8 Analysis of samples re-
vealed the presence of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which
resulted in the necessary removal of approximately 1,500 cubic
yards of contaminated soil.9 Homelite contacted the state's Envi-
1. See Textron, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 723 A.2d 1138, 1140 (1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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ronmental Management Department and off-site tests were per-
formed to determine to what extent the contamination had spread
to the subsurface environment. 10 In April of 1988, VOCs were dis-
covered in off-site wells, and further testing revealed some contam-
ination of private wells." Homelite then installed a temporary
water line to provide water to the residents who were affected by
the contamination. 12
Textron sought reimbursement from the defendant insurance
carriers for the millions of dollars it allegedly spent in connection
with the contaminated Gastonia site.13 The insurance carriers re-
fused to pay Textron's claim, and Textron commenced this suit.1 4
The trial judge determined Textron had presented insufficient evi-
dence to raise a material issue of fact and granted summary judg-
ment on behalf of the insurance carriers. 15
BACKGROUND
In CPC International, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus In-
surance Co., 16 plaintiff CPC International (CPC) was a packaging
and manufacturing corporation in New Jersey, which had a $25
million excess-liability policy from defendant Northbrook Excess &
Surplus Insurance Co. 17 The policy was effective from July of 1979
to July of 1980.18 One of CPC's subsidiaries experienced a massive
perchloroethylene spill at its Rhode Island plant in 1974.19 At the
time of the spill, CPC denied the resulting contamination of nearby
water supplies, but in 1979, during the Northbrook policy period, it
was discovered that there was contamination of wells in the sur-
rounding area.20 Northbrook denied liability under the policy, ar-
guing that the property damage had not occurred during the policy
period, and therefore, coverage was not triggered.2 1 CPC sued
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 1140-41.
16. 668 A.2d 647 (R.I. 1995).
17. See CPC Int'l, 668 A.2d at 647.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 648.
20. See id.
21. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
Northbrook for indemnity, to include cleanup costs and other
damages. 22
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land granted Northbrook's motion for judgment as a matter of law,
adopting the position that the appropriate trigger-of-coverage was
when the damage actually occurred, and held that coverage was
not triggered because the triggering event occurred before the pol-
icy period.23 On appeal, the First Circuit certified the question of
when the coverage was triggered under Rhode Island law to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court.24 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
answered that an "occurrence" causing property damage takes
place "when property damage ... manifests itself or is discovered
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, is discoverable." 25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In Textron, the supreme court held that the answer it provided
in CPC is the appropriate standard that the trial judge should
have applied to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
existed to defeat a summary judgment motion in a trigger-of-cover-
age case. 26 The court explained that although CPC specifically
dealt with a situation in which the damage was discovered during
the period of coverage, CPC does not stand for the proposition that
the damage must actually be discovered during the insured period
to trigger coverage. 27 Rather, the court explained that CPC sets
forth three situations that trigger coverage: when the property
damage manifests itself, when the damage is discovered; and when
the damage is, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, discovera-
ble. 28 The trial justice below considered only whether the damage
was discovered during the coverage period and found no evidence
that the damage was actually discovered before 1988.29 The
supreme court reasoned that the trial justice erred in failing to
22. See id.
23. See id. at 648-49.
24. See id. at 649.
25. Id.
26. See Textron, 723 A.2d at 1143.
27. See id. at 1142.
28. See id. at 1143 (citing CPC Int'l, 668 A.2d at 649).
29. See id.
7692000]
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consider whether the damage was, with reasonable diligence, dis-
coverable before 1988.30
The supreme court concluded that the evidence presented be-
low, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, raised a
genuine issue of material fact.31 While the motion for summary
judgment was being heard, Textron argued to the trial justice that
although the damage was not actually discovered during the pe-
riod of coverage, it could have been discovered during the policy
period with the exercise of due diligence.3 2 The trial justice invited
Textron to produce an affidavit from an expert saying that the
damage was discoverable. 33 Approximately three months later,
Textron produced an affidavit from an expert which indicated that
research revealed the damage had existed and was discoverable
from the 1950's through the date of actual discovery.3 4
The supreme court noted, however, that Textron had the bur-
den of not only showing that the contamination was present during
the policy period, but also that it could have been discovered dur-
ing that period in the exercise of reasonable diligence. 35 Textron
attempted to meet this burden by presenting three affidavits from
current and former employees of the Gastonia facility who had per-
sonal knowledge of overflow and leaks of solvents at the site.36 The
supreme court reasoned that the known leaks and spillage would
have put Textron on notice of the possible contamination, and that
a person exercising reasonable diligence would have tested for and
discovered the soil and groundwater contamination. 37  The
supreme court concluded that in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the affidavits provided by Textron raised a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether the contamination was dis-
coverable with the exercise of due diligence during the policy
period.3 8 The court therefore held that the trial court erred in
granting the motion for summary judgment on the issue of trigger-
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1144.
32. See id. at 1143.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1143-44.
35. See id. at 1144 (citing CPC Int'l, 668 A.2d at 649).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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of-coverage. 39 The judgment was vacated and the case was
remanded.40
CONCLUSION
In Textron, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island clarified the CPC standard. The
court held that the proper test for determining trigger-of-coverage
in actions against insurers is whether the property damage
manifests itself or is discovered, or is discoverable in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, during the period of coverage. The court ex-
plained that when considering a motion for summary judgment, a
judge must consider whether an issue of material fact exists as to
each part of this three-part test, rather than simply considering
when the damage was actually discovered.
Jennifer K. Towle
39. See id.
40. See id.
20001
